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TORTS 
Ralph Michael Stein* 
About the only thing a teacher of tort law can be sure of is 
that each year he or she will witness new efforts, some successful 
and most not, to extend the reach and effect of the law of private 
wrongs. Last year's Survey article analyzed a wide range of tort 
issues1 and while New York courts handed down fewer tort opin- 
ions of broad implication this Survey year, there is much to study 
and to apply in future litigation. As always, tort law is a somewhat 
quixotic but nonetheless valid barometer of shifting societal and 
judicial values about the nature of harm. 
A. Informed Consent 
The usual mini-flood of informed consent cases did not flow 
from New York's courts during the Survey year. Perhaps, just per- 
haps, physicians are learning to discharge the duty imposed by law 
and these actions, which account for much insurance payout to 
plaintiffs, may be declining. 
A typical case is Crisher v. Spak, in which a motion by defen- 
dants to set aside a jury verdict was denied.2 What is atypical is 
that this informed consent case was premised not on the failure to 
explain risks and complications, but rather on the failure to dis- 
close a remote but potentially critical diagnosis that surgery would 
reveal. The plaintiff consulted the defendant about a problem with 
her right foot, for which surgery was performed? The patient ex- 
perienced further difficulty and the defendant recommended addi- 
tional surgery, indicating that a pinched nerve might be the source 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. The author is a co-author 
of the recently published treatise Comparative Negligence (Matthew Bender 1984), and he 
frequently lectures on medical, psychiatric, and nursing malpractice law. The author ac- 
knowledges the valuable aid of reseach assistants Laurie Marchii and Deborah Glasser. 
1. Stein, Torts, 1983 Survey of N.Y. Law, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 651, 651-84 (1984). 
2. 122 Misc. 2d 355, 471 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1983). 
3. Id. at 356, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 742. 
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of the patient's p r~b lem.~  The court noted: 
What the doctor failed to advise his patient a t  the time was that 
he did not know what was causing the pinched nerve and that 
surgery was necessary to make that determination. Further, the 
doctor did not tell her that one of the possible causes of her pain 
was a tumor. He testified that, indeed, he did not even consider 
the possibility of a tumor." 
The plaintiffs problem turned out to be a tumor that was not 
diagnosed until some eight months after her refusal to undergo an 
operation by the defendant for the "pinched ne r~e . "~  The finding 
of a malignancy necessitated a below-knee arnp~tation.~ The jury 
returned a $1,500,000 verdict for the plaintiff that was minimally 
reduced on the grounds of comparative negligen~e.~ 
In sustaining the jury verdict for the plaintiff, the trial judge 
accepted approvingly, but misanalyzed,9 the leading California case 
of Truman v. Thomas.l0 The trial court concluded that the defen- 
dant's negligence consisted of a failure to observe a standard of 
due care in treating the plaintiff, rather than a failure to obtain 
informed consent, noting that "[a] breach of the duty of due care 
is negligence, not a lack of informed consent."" 
In Truman, a pivotal case involving a physician's failure to ex- 
plain the benefits of a routine Pap test to a young woman who 
refused the test and who subsequently died of an atypical neo- 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. See id. a t  358, 471 N.Y.S.2d a t  744. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. a t  355, 471 N.Y.S.2d a t  742. 
9. See id. a t  357-58, 471 N.Y.S.2d a t  743. 
10. 27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980). The court also discussed 
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). 
In Truman, the patient declined to undergo a Pap test, indicating that concern for the 
cost of the procedure was part of the basis for refusal. A Pap test is a quick, harmless, and 
inexpensive means of detecting a malignancy. In developing informed consent law, the Cali- 
fornia court posed the question "whether Dr. Thomas breached his duty of care to Mrs. 
Truman when he failed to inform her of the potentially fatal consequences of allowing cervi- 
cal cancer to develop undetected by a pap smear." 27 cal. 3d a t  290, 611 P.2d a t  905, 165 
Cal. Rptr. a t  311. Truman stands for the concept that informed consent doctrine requires 
that the physician explain the benefits of a diagnostic procedure. Where the procedure is 
simple and relatively free of risk, the failure to explain the reason for proposing the test is a 
breach of the informed consent duty. Of course, no cause of action materializes unless the 
risk that the test should have discovered actually exists and harm to the patient results. 
11. 122 Misc. 2d a t  35, 471 N.Y.S.2d a t  743. 
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plasm, the concept of informed consent was substantially but ra- 
tionally enlarged. I t  is axiomatic that any unreasonable failure to 
obtain informed consent is in itself a breach of a duty of due care. 
The court in Truman asserted that the unreasonable failure to ex- 
plain the possible, though not necessarily likely, ramifications of 
refusing a diagnostic procedure deprived the patient of the right to 
choose or reject medical care on an informed basis.12 
While it can be argued that, in Crisher u. Spak,  the defen- 
dant's own admission that he did not suspect a tumor may inde- 
pendently suggest a failure of due care,13 the crux of the plaintiffs 
case is supported by Truman and is an informed consent problem. 
Had she been informed that a second procedure was needed to de- 
termine an as-yet unknown reason for her continuing discomfort 
and pain, she would have been in a position to evalute her course 
of action more realistically. In all probability, the term "pinched 
nerve7' suggests little of serious import to the average patient and 
certainly does not raise the spectre of a malignancy. 
It should be expected, indeed encouraged, that Truman and 
the doctrine announced in that case will form the basis of future 
actions in New York. These types of actions are true informed con- 
sent cases. The failure to provide sufficient, or any, information on 
the possible benefits of diagnostic tests or exploratory surgery in 
reality often controls the patient's choice of options. The failure to 
explain what such medical intervention might disclose is often 
more dangerous to the actual welfare of a patient than the more 
typical situation in which a doctor withholds information, receives 
less than legally valid informed consent and, as is the case in most 
instances, nothing unfavorable happens. Something very unfavora- 
ble happened to Mrs. Chrisher, a result against which California 
law strives to guard. New York law should be equally assertive in 
requiring physician disclosure. 
12. See 27 Cal. 3d a t  293-94, 611 P.2d a t  906-07, 165 Cal. Rptr. a t  312-13. 
13. Because Dr. Spak did not reveal his lack of knowledge about the cause of the plain- 
tiffs discomfort and pain, she declined to accept his recommendation for a second surgical 
procedure. 122 Misc. 2d a t  356, 471 N.Y.S.2d a t  742. Dr. Spak knew what procedure he 
wished to perform and i t  seems highly likely that had the p la in t s  consented to the surgery, 
the malignancy would have been discovered, probably saving her leg. Although the defen- 
dant may have lacked the knowledge to suspect the existence of a malignant tumor-and 
this is not clear by any means-the real problem is that Mrs. Crisher declined the procedure 
because of a lack of information. 
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B. Arbitration 
Alternatives to medical malpractice litigation have been pro- 
posed, tested, rejected, praised, and damned in a number of juris- 
dictions. Arbitration, usually accepted enthusiastically in the world 
of commercial law, has been advanced as a cost-reducing measure 
to slow the flow of actions against physicians. New York physicians 
have seemed especially resistant, often even hostile, to the concept 
of arbitrating claims of substandard medical care." 
In Sanchez u. Sirmons16 a plaintiffs motion to stay the arbi- 
tration of a medical malpractice claim was granted. The patient 
had consulted the defendant for an elective abortion, which he per- 
formed at  his office.l6 Prior to the procedure, the plaintiff signed a 
"Consent to Abortion" form that contained a fairly standard arbi- 
tration clause.17 Subsequently, believing herself to be the victim of 
14. I have discussed arbitration with groups of physicians over the past few years. 
While expressing a sense of helplessness and rage over the medical malpractice dilemma, 
most physicians are reluctant to explore arbitration. The most frequent objection is that the 
insertion of an arbitration clause in a surgical consent document or the proferring of an 
arbitration agreement to a new patient disturbs the relationship of trust between patient 
and physician. Additionally, i t  is often argued that the existence of an arbitration agreement 
sows the seeds of litigation in the minds of patients not so disposed. Given the number of 
medical malpractice actions in New York, i t  is d i icul t  to believe that patients will be en- 
couraged to bring even more actions because of arbitration clauses. There is also no evidence 
whatsoever that an arbitration clause by itself will in any way interfere with the goal of an 
effective doctor-patient relationship. Just as many doctors fear giving information in order 
to obtain informed consent, many are reluctant to explain the existence of arbitration be- 
cause of their own reluctance to deal with a possibility of future dispute. 
15. 121 Misc. 2d 249, 467 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co. 1983). 
16. Id. a t  249, 467 N.Y.S.2d a t  758. 
17. Id. a t  250-51, 467 N.Y.S.2d a t  758-759. Dr. Sirmons' consent form appeared as 
follows: 
1. I, Carmen Sanchez, do hereby give my authorization and consent to an abortion 
to be performed upon me on or about by Dr. Sirmons. 
2. I certify that I understand the meaning of the word abortion or termination of 
pregnancy. 
3. I further certify that I am seeking this procedure of my own free will and that no 
coercion has been used. 
4. I consent to the admininstration of anesthetics to be applied by or under the 
direction of the Doctor, and the use of such anesthetics as he may deem advisable in 
my case. 
I also consent that said Doctor preceding and following the operation, perform 
any other procedure or treatment which is deemed necessary or desirable in order 
to perform the abortion. 
5. Recognizing that an abortion requires the cooperation of technicians, Nurses, As- 
sistants, and other personnel, I give my further consent to administrations and pro- 
cedures on my body by all such qualified personnel working under the supervision 
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malpractice, Ms. Sanchez filed an action against Dr. Sirmons.ls La- 
boring under the soon-to-be-established delusion that an arbitra- 
tion clauselS meant that there would be arbitration, the defendant 
demanded that the clause be invoked, which led to the plaintiffs 
motion to stay arbitratioa20 Justice Cotton found that "Dr. Sir- 
mons may not fairly demand arbitration of the malpractice action 
brought against him by Ms. San~hez."~' While the arbitration 
clause did not state that a legal right to trial by jury was being 
waived, it did clearly indicate that the patient's sole remedy was 
a rb i t r a t i~n .~~  The plaintiff was, a t  the time she sought the defen- 
dant's services, twenty-seven years old, and could read and under- 
stand English. She stated that she did not study the provisions of 
the form she signed because "she thought that she was only giving 
her consent to submit to an abo r t i~n . "~~  
While the court rejected the plainti£F's claim that an arbitra- 
of said Doctor before, during and after the operation to be performed. 
6. Despite the great technical strides that have been made over the past decades, 
the practice of medicine is still an art and not a science. I have not been given any 
guarantee or promises of complete success and satisfaction from the procedure. 
7. I have been informed that the risks of the abortion procedure occur in less than 
0.5%. These risks are possible retained placental tissue, bleeding, infection or 
perforation. 
8. I acknowledge that no guarantee or assurance has been made by anyone regard- 
ing the operation which I have requested and authorized. 
9. I agree that any dispute or claim which I may have relating to the abortion or any 
related medical procedure or any consequences thereof shall be determined solely 
by arbitration under the auspices and pursuant to the rules and regulations of the 
American Arbitration Association. 
10. I agree that this Consent to Abortion shall be b id ing  upon me and my heirs, 
executors, and administrators. 
11. I, the undersigned, grant permission to release an abstract of my Medical Rec- 
ord to my designated Doctor. 
Witness: Names of Patientlsl Carmen Sanchez 
Date: 6/28/80 Name of Parent: Tomasa Sanchez 
Guardian if Minor: 
18. Id. a t  249, 467 N.Y.S.2d a t  758. 
19. See paragraph 9 of the consent form set out supra note 17. 
20. See 121 Misc. 2d a t  249-50, 467 N.Y.S.2d a t  758. 
21. Id. a t  250, 467 N.Y.S.2d a t  758. 
22. The form can be re-drafted to convey exactly the waiver to trial by jury. The real 
issue seems to be validating the concept of an arbitration agreement. I t  is easy to envision a 
future case featuring an arbitration clause drafted to conform with the objections raised in 
this case. What is also foreseeable is a judicial statement that the plaintiff did not under- 
stand the central importance of trial by jury in our country. 
23. 121 Misc. 2d a t  251, 467 N.Y.S.2d a t  759. 
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tion clause was per se a contract of the court's analysis 
of the clause robbed it of any operative vitality. The standard im- 
posed by Justice Cotton for waiving a trial by jury is greater than 
that demanded of parties to contracts not involving medical ser- 
vices. The court also believed that the "Consent to Abortion" form 
by itself was mi~leading.2~ More to the point, the court, with seem- 
ing approval, quoted an authority who states that the object of ar- 
bitration clauses in medical practice is to hold down losses, and 
implied that this is somehow a bad thing.e6 
Whatever the problems of enforcing arbitration clauses in 
other medical and surgical settings, Sanchez u. Sirmons would 
have been a good place to uphold such a clause while transmitting 
a statement about a patient's duty to understand the nature of a 
legal and a medical transaction. Elective abortions are frequently 
traumatic emotionally, but they are very safe medically. The plain- 
tiff's procedure took place in the defendant's office. The form she 
was given is a model of clarity and there is no suggestion she was 
unusually upset or in any way unable to understand the form. 
While an argument can be made for a more conspicuous placing of 
the arbitration clause,2' a counter argument cogently asserts that 
such a step unnecessarily heightens tension and introduces distrac- 
tive and clinically detrimental issues.es It is not clear that New 
York courts are ready to recognize binding arbitration in medical 
malpractice cases, regardless of the positioning of the clause or the 
size of the type in which its provisions are announced. 
The provision for medical malpractice arbitration in no way 
excuses medical malpractice, nor does it  result in the denial of a 
fair recovery of damages by victims of substandard medical care. 
24. See id. a t  252, 467 N.Y.S.2d a t  759. 
25. See id. a t  253-54,467 N.Y.S.2d a t  760. 
26. See id. a t  253,467 N.Y.S.2d a t  760 (citing Henderson, Contractual Problems in the 
Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 58 VA L. REV. 947 (1972)). 
27. The court looked a t  a California statute requiring a conspicuous placement of the 
arbitration clause. See 121 Misc. 2d a t  254,467 N.Y.S.2d a t  760 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
3 1295 (West 1982)). Section 1295 requires that any provision for arbitration of a medical 
malpractice claim must be contained in the first article of the contract. The California law 
further requires that a notice to patients must appear in a t  least 10-point bold red type, 
stating that signing the clause relinquishes the right to a jury or court trial. See CAL. CN. 
PROC. CODE 1295. 
28. To give a patient fair notice about the import of an arbitration clause must not lead 
to attempts to place the fact of arbitration as the most importance piece of information in 
establishing the doctor-patient relationship. 
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The fears that courts expressed about arbitration in the infancy of 
that process are voiced again when physicians seek alternatives to 
litigation. Certainly there are many instances in which an arbitra- 
tion clause in a contract for medical services is a true contract of 
adhesion. In some other circumstances, it would be unfair to apply 
an arbitration clause. A physician's desire to utilize arbitration 
where procedures are elective and clinically neither life-threaten- 
ing nor unusual, however, should be encouraged rather than 
thwarted. If notice about arbitration and its effect is judicially 
mandated to require a doctrine of "Medical Miranda warnings," a 
valuable adjunct and alternative to litigation is practically lost. 
Lawyers may benefit, but injured patients will not. Neither will the 
public benefit a t  a time when costs associated with medical mal- 
practice litigation continue to rise. . 
C. Wrongful Birth 
Wrongful birth cases continue to arise because it still costs a 
lot of money to raise a child. If the child was unwanted in the first 
instance and the parents thought a physician had made it impossi- 
ble for conception to occur, the ingredients exist for the institution 
of a lawsuit, regardless of the clearly stated New York law on the 
subject. 
In Jean-Charles v. Planned Parenthood Association of Mo- 
hawk Valley, Inc.,PB the second department dismissed a cause of 
action that was predicated essentially on the non-existent and the- 
ologically irreverent tort of wrongful conception. The court, follow- 
ing established principles, upheld a claim for the cost of the birth 
of a child whose presence prudent medical advice and procedures 
should have prevented, but denied the open-ended and never-end- 
ing costs of rearing a child.s0 There is not presently the slightest 
glimmer of hope for a change in doctrine on the New York judicial 
horizon. 
Similarly, in Weintraub v. Brown:' the second department 
29. 99 A.D.2d 542, 471 N.Y.2d 622 (2d Dep't 1984). 
30. See id. at 542, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 623. 
31. 98 A.D.2d 339,470 N.Y.S.2d 634 (2d Dep't 1983). An additional failed surgical b i ih  
control case in which the parents wanted the physician to pay for rearing a normal child is 
OToole v. Greenberg, 98 A.D.2d 814,470 N.Y.S.2d 31 (2d Dep't 1983). Why do New York 
lawyers keep bringing these wrongful conception actions? What do they tell their clients? 
Are these hopeless actions being brought on a contingency fee basis? 
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sustained the dismissal by the trial court of claims, based on the 
theory of reliance, against a vasectomy-performing physician, a va- 
sectomy-success-verifying pathologist, and a hospital for the cost 
of rearing the direct result of the plaintiff couple's reliance on the 
 defendant^.^^ The opinion in Weintraub is required reading for 
counsel tempted to initiate similar actions. Perhaps Survey articles 
for the next few years will not have to repeatedly discuss this issue. 
D. Miscellaneous 
A tragic case, Snow v. illustrates the scope of damages 
recoverable for negligence by acts of omission. The infant claimant 
had been institutionalized for much of his life, including time at 
Willowbrook State School during the period when its treatment of 
infant residents was shocking by penitentiary  standard^.^' The 
State of New York failed to conduct a number of diagnostic tests 
with regard to the hearing acuity of the child and as a result of 
non-existent or inadequate testing, the claimant was neither 
trained nor educated to the level he could have achieved.s6 The 
Court of Claims found that the malpractice in question was medi- 
cal, not educational, and the award was predicated on the failure 
to treat the claimant properly as a patient.s8 
While reducing the award of $2,500,000 to $1,500,000,87 the 
second department held that medical malpractice had resulted in 
the mistaken institutionalization which caused the infant claim- 
ant severe and permanent psychological damage and irreparably 
impaired his ability to speak, communicate and read [and that 
this] emanated from the use of an improper I.Q. test to assess the 
child's intellectual capacity. The allegations in [an educational 
malpractice allegation case] are pale in comparison to the reality 
of Donald Snow's s i tuat i~n .~~  
The court rejected any argument that educational malpractice, in 
effect, a nonexistent tort under New York law, rather than medical 
malpractice, dictated the result, noting that "[tlhe failure to [re- 
32. See id. at 340-49, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 636-41 
33. 98 A.D.2d 442, 469 N.Y.S.2d 959 (2d Dep't 1983). 
34. See id. at 443-44, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 960-61. 
35. Id. at 444-45, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 960-61. 
36. See id. at 445, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 961 (referring to Court of Claims decision). 
37. Id. at 450, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 964. 
38. Id. at 449, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 963. 
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evaluate and reassess the claimant] constituted a discernible act of 
medical malpractice on the part of the State rather than a mere 
error in judgment vis-a-vis claimant's educational progress. Conse- 
quently, this appeal does not involve a non-cognizable claim for 
educational malpractice . . . . ,)BS 
Whatever the merits of a distinct cause of action for educa- 
tional malpractice, Snow u. State lucidly outlines the essentially 
medical nature of infant institutionalization. Holistically, educa- 
tion is subsumed in the reality of total custodial control and that 
control is inherently based on a medical rnodel?O Thus, attempts 
to blunt allegations of medical malpractice by trying to separate 
the totality of custodial care into discrete elements is as unpersua- 
sive rationally as it is unacceptable judicially. 
E. Damages 
Survey articles in past years have paid scant attention to the 
question of damages and the role of appellate courts in revising 
trial awards. In Thornton v. Montefiore Hospital," the trial court 
drastically reduced a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case. 
While recognizing that "the setting aside of a jury verdict may not 
be lightly ~ndertaken,"'~ the court reduced a jury verdict of 
$1,000,000 for pain and suffering to $500,000, an award of 
$1,000,000 for future medical expenditures to an uninspiring 
$34,480, and damages of $500,000 for loss of earning ability to a 
still significant $350,000.'8 Awards for loss of services and payment 
of past expenses for the mother of the injured minor were similarly 
reduced." Worth noting is Justice Mercorella's observation, with 
regard to jury verdicts in medical malpractice cases, that insup- 
portable damages assessments are routine. "This is not a rare in- 
39. Id. at  450, 469 N.Y.S.26~at 964. 
40. How much of Donald Snow's condition was genetically determined and how much 
environmentally is undiscoverable. The profound deficits, neurological and cognitive and 
possibly also affective, which characterized Donald's condition are treated by a team, which 
is always directed by a physician. The learning disabilities are manifestations of the under- 
lying deficits. For the State to argue that Donald's claim was really one sounding in educa- 
tional malpractice is ridiculous, untenable, and unsupported by any case law. 
41. 120 Misc. 2d 1003,469 N.Y.S. 979 (Sup. Ct., Bronx Co. 1983), modified, 99 A.D.2d 
1024, 473 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1st Dep't 1984). 
42. 120 Misc. 2d a t  1004,469 N.Y.S.2d a t  981. 
43. See id. a t  1006-08, 469 N.Y.S.2d a t  982-83. 
44. Id. 
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stance of gross excessiveness. Rather it has become an all too com- 
mon occurrence in this country and the trend continues and 
appears to proliferate a t  least in this Court's experience."'" 
Equally worth noting is that the first department reduced the 
trial judge's revised ~erdict. '~ Pain and suffering damages were cut 
by a further $100,000 and impairment of earning ability was 
slashed to $50,000.'7 
The remittitur, the procedural device by which a jury's dam- 
age award is diminished, whether at the trial or appellate stage, is 
a valid and effective curative device. It  would be better, however, 
for juries to be carefully instructed so that the incidence of exces- 
sive verdicts described by the trial judge in Thornton declines. Too 
frequent use of the remittitur undermines public confidence in the 
role of the jury, and verdicts motivated by sympathy or based on 
shaky factual evidence impose intolerable stresses on insurers and, 
ultimately, on consumers. A decrease in the tendency of juries to 
return fantastic and unsustainable, but sometimes actually sus- 
tained, verdicts may lessen the cry for statutory attention to the 
problem of damages. Such so-called reforms may in the long run 
create fairness problems. Justice Mercorella's observation is also a 
warning. 
A. General 
As readers of general publications know, pizza parlor owners 
have been waging a battle, probably successfully, to convince the 
public that pizza is not junk food, but is actually rich nutritionally. 
Threatening the campaign to persuade parents to allow their chil- 
dren to eat great quantities of pizza pie was an attempt in the 
third department to have pizza judicially declared to be a "danger- 
ous instrument." In Keohan v. Di Paola,'* the father of the eight- 
year old plaintiff, Melinda, drove to the defendants' pizzeria. An 
employee brought the boxed pizza to the car and placed it through 
the right rear window on Melinda's lap, although Mr. Keohan had 
45. Id. at 1005,469 N.Y.S.2d at 981. 
46. See Thornton v. Montefiore Hosp., 99 A.D.2d 1024, 473 N.Y.S.2d 758 (1st Dep't 
1984). 
47. See id. 
48. 97 A.D.2d 596, 468 N.Y.S.2d 218 (3d Dep't 1983). 
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told the employee to put the pizza on the front seat.'9 On the ride 
home Melinda began screaming because of the pain from burns 
caused by the pizza.60 She was hospitalized for several days.61 
An action was begun by Melinda's father against the owners of 
the pizza establishmentP2 They, in turn, sought indemnification 
from Melinda's father alleging that his negligent supervision 
caused the injury.6s Opposing a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a cause of action, the pizza parlor owners argued that their 
product was a "dangerous instrument." Special Term granted the 
requested summary judgment and the pizza parlor owners ap- 
pealed to the third department. Relying on Nolechek v. GesualeP4 
the appellate court a r m e d  summary judgment on behalf of Me- 
linda's father.66 
New York law does not recognize liability through either con- 
tribution or indemnification "to third parties for damages resulting 
from failing to supervise his or her The seeming inflexibil- 
ity of this doctrine is somewhat modified by the "dangerous instru- 
ment" exception. While ingenious, the attempt of the pizza parlor 
owners to have their product join the ranks of "bicycles, lawn 
mowers, power tools, motorcycles, or  automobile^,"^^ products al- 
ready designated as dangerous by the Court of Appeals, was prop- 
erly rejected.68 Although the Court of Appeals has not provided a 
comprehensive list of products that allow utilization of the danger- 
ous instrument rule, it is clear that some products are both inher- 
ently dangerous and categorically unsuitable for entrustment to a 
Indeed, allowing a child to operate a car or motorcycle may 
be a criminal offense in itself. The mere fact that an object can 
cause serious injury does not, and should not, bring it within the 
49. Id. at 596, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 219. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 597, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 219. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d 1268,413 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1978) (tortfeasor may seek in- 
demnity or contribution from injured child's parent when injury results from parent's negli- 
gent entrusting of dangerous instrument to chid). 
55. See 97 A.D.2d at 597,468 N.Y.S.2d at 219. 
56. Id. 
57. Id., 468 N.Y.S.2d at 220 (quoting Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d at 338, 385 
N.E.2d at 1272, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 344). 
58. See 97 A.D.2d at 597,468 N.Y.S.2d at 220. 
59. See id.  
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dangerous instrument rule. Although the third department, in 
finding that pizza is not a dangerous instrument, stopped there, it 
can readily be seen that no food product can qualify under 
Nolechek. 
In a second negligent supervision action, Zikely v. Zikely,BO 
the second department f i rmed  the dismissal of a complaint alleg- 
ing that a defendant mother caused a child's burns by allowing the 
infant to wander into a bathroom and to fall into a tub containing 
hot water. Both Nolechek v. Gesualesl and Holodook v. SpencePZ 
were cited to support the appellate court's action.6s The court, 
however, may have applied what appeared to be controlling case 
law in an inappropriate setting. 
Justice Gibbons, dissenting in Zikely, highlighted an impor- 
tant factual distinction between this action and the cases relied 
upon by the majority. Justice Gibbons stated that 
[tlhe facts in this case do not directly involve a parental decision 
about how much freedom or responsibility to give a child. Rather, 
this case involves.an unconsidered lapse which exposes the child 
to a dangerous condition created by the parent, independent of 
and separate from the parent-child relationship. Holding the 
parent liable for creating that condition does not impinge on the 
exercise of parental authority and does not involve familial 
 relationship^.^ 
While the appellate division majority decision was upheld by 
the Court of Appeals:" suggest that Justice Gibbons provided the 
better reasoning. Negligent supervision has developed as a theory 
by which an injured child argues that the quality of parental atten- 
tion, or the lack thereof, violated a standard of due care of parent- 
ing, and that recovery should be permitted for injuries incurred. 
While recognizing that this is an especially sensitive area, some ju- 
risdictions permit recovery for negligent supervision, while New 
York firmly rules out even the suggestion of a cause of action for 
60. 98 A.D.2d 815, 470 N.Y.S.2d 33 (2d Dep't 1983), aff'd, 62 N.Y.2d 907, 467 N.E.2d 
892,479 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1984). 
61. 46 N.Y.2d 332, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340 (1978). 
62. 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974). 
63. See 98 A.D.2d at 815-16, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 34-35. 
64. Id. at 817, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 36 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
65. See Ziely v. Zikely, 62 N.Y.2d 907, 467 N.E.2d 892, 479 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1982). 
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negligent supervis i~n.~~ 
The focus in Zikely should be on the actions of the parent 
insofar as he or she created a dangerous condition. By statutes, 
every parent must protect a m a t i v e l y  the health and safety of his 
or her child. Using conventional duty and reasonable standard of 
care analysis, there seems to be little doubt that the defendant, 
Mrs. Zikely, would have been liable to her child's playmate if both 
fell into the tub together. The real issue is the creation of a grave 
hazard with serious foreseeable consequences. The negligence in 
supervision does not go to parenting per se, but to the establish- 
ment of a hazard, perhaps almost a trap, where young children are 
known to be about the premises. Little social utility is served by 
denying recovery where parents proximately cause injuries through 
behavior essentially extrinsic to the special qualities of parenting 
which, by themselves, arguably justify a refusal to recognize a gen- 
eral cause of action for negligent parenting.'j7 
In the area of duty, United States District Judge Werker, in 
Sprayregen v. American Airlines, I n ~ . , 6 ~  a diversity action apply- 
ing New York law, denied a motion for summary judgment finding 
that, even with an airline's duty to exercise the highest degree of 
care for a passenger's safety, the airline need not inform cold suf- 
ferers of the consequences of flying.6B The plaints, a physician, 
claimed a permanent hearing loss after flying on the defendant's 
plane while suffering a head cold.70 The court held: 
There is no evidence that American knew that Sprayregen had a 
head cold, and it is agreed that Sprayegen never informed Ameri- 
can of the discomfort that he experienced upon descent of the 
plane. The court therefore finds that American had no duty to 
warn Sprayregen of the dangers of flying with a head cold.71 
66.See generally W .  KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 914-15 (5th ed. 1984). 
67. Collusion is certainly not a serious bar to considering this cause of action. In most 
instances, the serious injuries themselves bespeak the lack of collusion. While i t  cannot be 
ruled out that a few parents might commit crimes against helpless children in order to cre- 
ate litigation against insurance companies, this is too bizarre and rare a possibility to raise 
as a serious objection. In instances of serious injury caused by a hazard created by the par- 
ent, the availability of insurance benefits may be the only means to correct or minimiie the 
harm inflicted upon the child. 
68. 570 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
69. See id. at  18. 
70. Id. a t  17. 
71. Id. a t  18. 
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Litigation arising from the Great Con Ed Blackout of July 13, 
1977, is still in the courts. In Strauss v. Belle Realty C O . , ~ ~  the 
second department dismissed a complaint brought by a tenant in- 
jured in a common area of his building during the blackout. The 
plaintiff stated both a third-party contract beneficiary theory of 
recovery and cause of action in negligen~e.~~ 
In a brief discussion of the plaintiffs negligence cause of ac- 
tion, the appellate division majority found that the defendant util- 
ity owed no duty to the plaintiff," despite the fact that "[ilt is true 
that the injury suffered by the plaintiff was to some degree foresee- 
able . . . ."76 The court contrasted the plaintiffs plight to that of 
the victim in Hall v. Consolidated Edison Corp0ration,7~ where 
electricity had been intentionally terminated for one building and 
the tenant slipped on some wax drippings in a darkened hallway. 
Hall permitted a cause of action, and the majority distinguished 
this obviously inapposite case by commenting that "[olur situation 
involves, a t  most, grossly negligent conduct decting millions of 
people."77 
Responding in a well-reasoned dissent, Justice Gibbons re- 
jected the majority's belief that "a reasonable opportunity to re- 
duce the risk of a foreseeable injury is lacking."78 Justice Gibbons 
argued that: 
Such is not the case. It certainly is true that the ability to adopt 
practical means to avoid injury is an aspect of the question of 
duty. However, from the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
happening of the blackout. . . there can be no doubt that Con Ed 
could have fairly easily prevented a blackout from occurring. The 
imposition of a duty on Con Ed is not a demand to do the impos- 
sible. Rather, it is merely a requirement that the utility exercise, 
at least, slight care in its  operation^.^^ 
Justice Gibbons analyzed the interrelationship between tort 
and contract theories of recovery and found that existing case law 
72. 98 A.D.2d 424, 469 N.Y.S.2d 948 (2d Dep't 1983). 
73. Id. at 425, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 949. 
74. See id. at 428, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 951. 
75. Id. 
76. 104 Misc. 2d 565,428 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1980). 
77. 98 A.D.2d at 429, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 951-52. 
78. Id. at 432, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 953 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). 
79. Id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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posed no barriers to the maintenance of the plaintiffs cause of ac- 
t i~n.~O Justice Gibbons stated that 
[wlhat plaintiff is maintaining, a proposition with which I agree, 
is that he is within one of the classes of persons to whom Con Ed 
owes a duty to make reparations for injuries suffered as a result 
of its gross negligence. That class, made up, among others, of te- 
nants injured as was the plaintiff, is foreseeable, is limited in size, 
is defined, and consists of persons who Con Ed must be presumed 
to have contemplated would rely on its service on a regular basis. 
In such circumstances, I can perceive of no public policy justifica- 
tion for excusing Con Ed from liability on the alleged basis that 
plaintiff was not a member of a class to whom Con Ed owed a 
duty of care.81 
It is likely that we wili witness again a major electric power 
blackout. The disposition of Strauss and the reasoned analysis of 
the dissent will be reviewed in future litigation. While it can be 
argued with some force that traditional negligence law is ill-suited 
for modern mass disaster and public emergency scenarios, such a 
conclusion clearly has such sweeping implications for change that 
it  must be reserved for the Legislature. Traditional duty analysis 
must be applied in all common law negligence actions, whether 
there are one or one million potential plaintiffs. Public utility oper- 
ations are not technological experiments. They are standardized 
applications of well-developed and thoroughly understood, if often 
undercontrolled, technology. Reliance on utility companies is total 
and inescapable. Liability may or may not follow a failure of a util- 
ity, but the issue of duty that allows a plaintiff to demonstrate 
breach of a standard of care and proximately caused harm should 
be resolved categorically against the utilities. 
In determining a reasonable standard of care, the existence of 
an emergency may be considered in weighing the reasonableness of 
an actor's behavior.82 The rule is simple, unlike its application. The 
prime problem is the determination of what constitutes an 
emergency. 
In Shaw u. Manufacturers Hanover Trust C O . , ~ ~  the first de- 
partment found that "the bank is not entitled to the emergency 
80. See id. at 432-40, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 953-58 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). 
81. Id. at 438-39, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 957. 
82. See generally W. KEETON, supra note 66, at 196-97. 
83. 95 A.D.2d 738, 464 N.Y.S.2d 172 (1st Dep't 1983). 
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instruction because the possibility of a bank robbery cannot be 
said to be one that is not anti~ipated."~' Reversing a verdict for the 
bank and its employee, an off-duty police officer who wounded the 
plaintiff while attempting to foil a bank heist, the court found that 
the emergency rule was unavailable for two reasons. First, the pos- 
sibility of a bank robbery was known to all employees and they, in 
fact, had been trained as to procedures in case of a robbery.86 Sec- 
ond, and of great importance, the emergency rule is not available if 
the actor's conduct aggravated or created the emergen~y.~~ The po- 
lice officer-bank employee, violating police procedures and a rea- 
sonable standard of care, opened fire, even after the felon recog- 
nized him and threatened violence if he resisted the robbery 
attempt.87 
There can be emergencies within emergencies. In Shaw, no 
emergency existed from a tort standpoint. The defendants may not 
benefit from a special emergency rule but must show that their be- 
havior was reasonable under the circumstances. 
Two important contribution decisions were announced during 
the Survey year. The New York Court of Appeals, in Mitchell v. 
New York Hospital,BB held that the agreement of all parties to an 
action will permit a settling tortfeasor to obtain contribution from 
another person, despite the restrictions imposed by section 15- 
108(c) of the General Obligations Law.P9 The plaintiff was burned 
by scalding steam, and brought an action against the hospital 
where he was injured while working as a steamfitter.OO The hospital 
sought contribution and indemnification in a third-party action 
against several par tie^.^' A settlement was reached.92 A stipulation 
was read into the record at  the time the parties informed the court 
of the proposed settlement that, among other provisions, stated 
that "[ilt is specifically agreed and understood by all of the Third- 
84. Id. at 739, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 174. 
85. See id. 
86. See id. at 740, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 174. 
87. Id. 
88. 61 N.Y.2d 208,461 N.E.2d 285,473 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1984), modifying 92 A.D.2d 832, 
461 N.Y.S.2d 49 (2d Dep't 1983). 
89. Section 15-108(c) provides that "[a] tortfeasor who has obtained his own release 
from liability shall not be entitled to contribution from any other person." N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. 
LAW 3 15-108(c) (McKinney 1978). 
90. 61 N.Y.2d at 212, 461 N.E.2d at 287,473 N.Y.S.2d at 150. 
91. Id. 
92. See id. 
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Party Defendants here that no one waives any rights to contribu- 
tions [sic] or indemnification by entering into this ~ettlernent."~~ 
The stipulation also provided for trial by New York Hospital 
against "each of the named third-party defendants,"@' and prior to 
trial the third-party defendants sought the protection of subdivi- 
sion (c) of section 15-108 of the General Obligations Law.B6 Mo- 
tions to dismiss were denied by the trial court, which found a 
waiver of the statutory bar against the seeking of contribution or 
indemnificati~n.~~ The first department reversed, finding that the 
statutory provisions could not be waived by agreement?? 
Without dissent, the Court of Appeals reversed the appellate 
division and upheld the stipulation of the parties to the litiga- 
t i ~ n . @ ~  The Court of Appeals stated that 
[wlhenever the enforceability of a stipulation among parties in a 
civil case is put in issue, we must begin our analysis with the rec- 
ognition that courts have long favored and encouraged the fash- 
ioning of stipulations as a means of expediting and simplifying 
the resolution of disputes. . . . We have repeatedly held that, un- 
less public policy is affronted, parties to a civil dispute are free to 
chart their own litigation course.Bs 
After this statement of broad policy encouraging settlements by 
parties, the Court of Appeals went on to find that "[tlhere can be 
no serious claim that the subject stipulation offends public pol- 
icy."loO The Court of Appeals held: 
The stipulation here is designed to insure the fair and prompt 
compensation of an injured party while reserving the right of one 
tort-feasor to seek contribution from the remaining wrongdoers in 
an effort to accomplish an equitable sharing of liability. We be- 
lieve stipulations such as this effectuate, rather than affront, the 
public policy of this State.Io1 
In reviewing the legislative history of subdivision (c) of section 
93. Id. at 213, 461 N.E.2d at 287,473 N.Y.S.2d at 150. 
94. Id. at 212, 461 N.E.2d at 287,473 N.Y.S.2d at 150. 
95. Id. at 213, 461 N.E.2d at 287,473 N.Y.S.2d at 150. 
96. Id. (referring to trial court decision). 
97. See Mitchell v. New York Hosp., 93 A.D.2d at 832,461 N.Y.S.2d at 50. 
98. See 61 N.Y.2d at 216-17, 461 N.E.2d at 290,473 N.Y.S.2d at 153. 
99. Id. at 214, 461 N.E.2d at 288, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 151 (citation omitted). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
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15-108 of the General Obligations Law, the Court noted that the 
statute represented a legislative awareness of and support for "eq- 
uitable sharing of liability."lo2 Where, as in the instant action, the 
stipulation waiving the statutory provision barring the seeking of 
contribution or indemnification was entered into, in effect, a t  arm's 
length and with full awareness by all parties of the implications, 
the positive legislative purpose is best served by upholding the 
stipulation, rather than by meaninglessly giving strict and control- 
ling status to the statutory subdivision.10g 
While it is unlikely that any large number of litigants will 
avail themselves of Mitchell, the case announced an additional 
means of negotiating equitable resolution of joint liability and 
should be welcomed for both its impact and its succinct but excel- 
lent restatement of policy. 
Subdivision (c) of section 15-108 of the General Obligations 
Law was also the subject of a second department review of an ac- 
tion commenced in the Court of Claims, Makeun v. State.lo4 In an 
action against defendant Makeun for personal injuries to the plain- 
tiff allegedly caused by, in part, water flowing from the defendant's 
land, a bifurcated trial was held.lo6 On the issue of liability, 
Makeun was found sixty-five percent liable, but a trial on the dam- 
ages question was not held until thirteen months later.lo6 Before 
the jury announced a verdict, Makeun settled with the plaintiff. 
He then sought contribution and indemnification from the State.Io7 
Under section 15-108, a tortfeasor who settled prior to a ver- 
dict could not seek con t r i bu t i~n .~~~  The second department noted 
that "[hlere, however, the court is presented with a somewhat dif- 
ferent and apparently novel situation. The settlement was reached 
after a jury verdict on culpability, but before a verdict and judg- 
ment on the issue of Affirming the Court of Claims, 
the second department determined that the general legislative 
preference for encouraging settlements would be upset if Makeun 
102. Id. at 215,461 N.E.2d at 289, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 152. 
103. See id. at 216-17, 461 N.E.2d at 289-90, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 152-53. 
104. 98 A.D.2d 583, 471 N.Y.S.2d 293 (2d Dep't 1984). 
105. Id. at 584, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 294. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW 815-108(c) (McKinney 1978). 
109. 98 A.D.2d at 586, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 295. 
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could seek contribution.l1° The court stated that 
[a] settling tort-feasor enjoys the protection of subdivision (b), 
which precludes a claim for contribution from being asserted 
against him. Without the presence of subdivision (c), the settlor, 
who is protected from contribution, would still be able to exercise 
a right of contribution against others.'ll 
While conceding that the result achieved here may not be just, the 
appellate division determined that change, if any, must come from 
the Legislature.l12 
It is doubtful that there is any injustice here. Makeun was free 
to settle or not to settle. His contribution possibilities were clear in 
law. Like many litigants, he gambled and, perhaps because of the 
unusual delay between trial for liability and trial for damages, he 
came out a little worse than he might have otherwise. The legisla- 
tive policy behind section 15-108(c) of the General Obligations 
Law was not violated by the result. 
B. State and Municipal Entities 
This Survey year was relatively light in terms of decisions sig- 
nificantly affecting state and local government tort law. One case 
of interest is Sega v. State.lls Consolidated with Cutway v. State, 
the cases involved injury to persons who were using recreationally 
land owned by the State of New York.l14 Both cases on appeal in- 
volved the applicability of section 9-103 of the General Obligations 
Law when raised by the state as a defense to actions for injuries.l16 
110. See id. at  586, 588, 471 N.Y.S.2d at  296, 297. 
111. Id. at  588, 471 N.Y.S.2d at  297. 
112. See id. at 591-92, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 299. 
113. 60 N.Y.2d 183, 456 N.E.2d 1174, 469 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1983). 
114. In Sega, the claimaint was injured while hiking in the Catskill Forest Preserve. 
The claimant was seriously injured when a pipe railing on which she was sitting came loose, 
causing her to fall into a creek. The recreational area was not supervised except for garbage 
collection. The claimant alleged ordinary negligence. See id. at  187-88, 456 N.E.2d at  1176, 
469 N.Y.S.2d at 53. In the companion action, Cutway u. State, the claimant was severely 
injured by a cable stretched a c r w  the road by state employees who were trying to combat 
vandalism and burglary of state buildings. Unlike Sega, the claimant in Cutway argued that 
the cable was a trap. No warning was posted. See id. at 188-89,456 N.E.2d at  1176-66,469 
N.Y.S.2d 53-54. Because the claimant could not establish any willful or malicious intent on 
the part of the state or its employees, however, his action failed together with the action in 
Sega. See id. at  192-92,456 N.E.2d at  1178-79, 469 N.Y.S.2d at  56. 
115. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW $ 9-103 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1984-1985). At the 
time of the case, Section 9-103 read: 
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The statute provides that no duty of care exists on the part of 
owners of land used for recreation if the owners do not charge 
users, and, if there is neither a willful nor an intentional failure to 
warn of danger or to guard against its existence.l16 Use of the 
State-owned land in these two cases was without charge to the 
publc. 
The Court of Appeals found that "[oln its face, section 9-103 
unambiguously includes public property within its purview."l17 
The Court applied the statute to the recreational property owned 
by the State and analyzed its impact. The Court noted that: 
[Nlothing in the statute suggest[s] that it  was meant to codify the 
common law . . . . Its scope is restricted to a limited number of 
activities . . . . [Slection 9-103 and its predecessors impose liabil- 
No duty to keep premises safe for certain uses; responsibility for acts of such users 
1. Except as provided in subdivision two, 
a. an owner, lessee or occupant of premises, whether or not posted as provided 
in section 11-2111 of the environmental conservation law, owes no duty to keep the 
premises safe for entry or use by others for hunting, fishing, or canoeing, boating, 
trapping, hiking, cross-country skiiig, speleological activities, horseback riding, bi- 
cycle riding, hang gliding, motorized vehicle operation for recreational purposes, 
snowmobile operation, cutting or gathering of wood for noncommercial purposes or 
trainiig of dogs, or to give warning of any hazardous condition or use of or structure 
or activity on such premises to persons entering for such purposes; 
b. an owner, lessee or occupant of premises who gives permission to another to 
pursue any such activities upon such premises does not thereby (1) extend any as- 
surance that the premises are safe for such purpose, or (2) constitute the person to 
whom permission is granted an invitee to whom a duty of care is owed, or (3) as- 
sume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused 
by any act of persons to whom the permission is granted. 
2. This section does not limit the liability which would otherwise exist 
a. for willful or malicious failure to guard, or to warn against, a dangerous con- 
dition, use, structure or activity; or 
b. for injury suffered in any case where permission to pursue any of the activi- 
ties enumerated in this section was granted for a consideration other than the con- 
sideration, if any, paid to said landowner by the state or federal government, or 
permission to train dogs was granted for a consideration other than that provided 
for in section 11-0925 of the environmental conservation law; or 
c. for injury caused, by acts of persons to whom permission to pursue any of the 
activies enumerated in this section was granted, to other persons as to whom the 
person granting permission, or the owner, lessee or occupant of the premises, owed a 
duty to keep the premises safe or to warn of danger. 
3. Nothing in this section creates a duty of care or ground of liability for injury to 
person or property. 
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW 5 9-103 (amended version a t  McKiney 1978 and Supp. 1984-1985). 
116. See id. 
117. Sega, 60 N.Y.2d a t  190, 456 N.E.2d a t  1177, 469 N.Y.S.2d a t  54. 
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ity only if there is a willful or malicious failure to warn. And the 
statute does not indicate any intent to except traps or concealed 
defects from this standard.l18 
The Court of Appeals decision in Sega clearly places the State, 
which provides extensive recreational grounds, on an equal footing 
with private landowners. The public policy of providing adequate 
recreational facilities is achieved without subjecting the state to 
claims for injuries resulting from ordinary negligence. Such claims 
would, at the least, cripple the public parks system and result in 
the curtailment of access. No resulting public benefit would be 
achieved. Under Sega, the State continues to share with private 
landowners liability for intentional wrongful acts. 
The doctrine of negligence per se does not create any special 
problems for first year law students. For some reason it has always 
bedeviled some trial judges. In Dance v. Town of S o ~ t h a r n p t o n , ~ ~ ~  
the second department found reversible error because the trial 
court charged that violation of a statute constituted negligence per 
se.120 The second department reasoned that violation of a "report- 
ing" statute that did not create a standard of care to protect mo- 
torists and did not necessarily reflect the motorist's competency 
could not constitute negligence per se.121 The statute dealt with a 
requirement that license holders report any personal injuries to the 
Commissioner of Motor Vehi~1es.l~~ The legislative history does 
not mention civil liability, but sound policy dictates that "to auto- 
matically derive a conclusion of negligence from violation of such 
statutes would present considerable potential for unfairness and 
overpuni~hment."~~~ Dance is a good opinion, in that it outlines 
the nature of negligence per se. 
A decision with disturbing policy implications is Frazier v. 
118. Id. a t  191, 456 N.E.2d a t  1178, 469 N.Y.S.2d a t  55 (citations omitted). 
119. 95 A.D. 442, 467 N.Y.S.2d 203 (2d Dep't 1983). 
120. See id. a t  448, 467 N.Y.S.2d a t  207. 
121. See id. a t  448-49, 467 N.Y.S.2d a t  208. 
122. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAW 3 506(4) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985), providing: 
Any person holding a license issued pursuant to this chapter who suffers per- 
manent loss of use of one or both hands or arms or of one or both feet or legs, or 
one eye shall, before operating any motor vehicle or motorcycle make report thereof 
to the commissioner, who shall take such reasonable action as may be proper under 
the divisions of this section. 
123. Dance, 95 A.D.2d a t  449, 467 N.Y.S.2d a t  208. 
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State,le4 in which the State was absolved of liability in an action 
based on the doctrine of respondeat superior for a shooting by a 
corrections officer. The officer pursued two men who had robbed 
him.le6 The claimant suffered a bullet wound in the foot when the 
state-employed corrections officer tried to apprehend the men who 
robbed him.lee The court majority analyzed the relevant statute 
defining the status held by the corrections officer, that of peace 
officer,le7 and found that the duties of a peace officer placed this 
officer's actions outside the scope of his duties.leS Further, relying 
on a case in which a police officer tortiously misused a claim of 
official authority to accomplish a personal-and illegal-end, the 
majority found that "liability cannot be foisted on the State for 
negligent acts committed by Warner [the corrections officer] for 
reasons personal to him and not in response to any duty owed by 
him to the State."leB 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Alexander reviewed the nature 
of the corrections officer's position and found that "he is not an 
ordinary citizen and assumes the duty to prevent crime and appre- 
hend criminals."lsO Justice Alexander also correctly pointed out the 
degree of control that the State maintains with regard to authoriz- 
ing corrections officers to carry weapons when off-duty.lsl 
Although Justice Alexander's dissent is persuasive, it does not 
go far enough. Neither the majority nor the dissent recognized the 
real public policy behind allowing non-police officers, such as cor- 
124. 100 A.D. 270, 474 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1st Dep't 1984). 
125. See id. a t  274, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 11. 
126. Id. a t  271, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 8. 
127. See id. at 272, 474 N.Y.S.2d at  9. 
128. See id. 
129. Id. a t  274,474 N.Y.S.2d at 11. The court majority relied on Stavitz v. City of New 
York, 98 A.D.2d 529,471 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1st Dep't 1984). In Stauitz, an off-duty police officer 
assaulted a neighbor with whom he was engaged in a dispute about sand dumped on a 
common driveway. Following the assault, the officer returned, displayed his shield, and ar- 
rested both his neighbor and his neighbor's mother, charging them with assault and re- 
sisting arrest. See Frazier, 100 A.D.2d at  274,474 N.Y.S.2d at 10-11. What relevance Stauitz 
has for Frazier u. State is beyond me. 
130. Frazier, 100 A.D.2d at 276, 474 N.Y.S.2d at  12 (Alexander, J., T in t ing) .  
131. See id. a t  278, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 13 (Alexander, J., dissenting). Police officers are 
required, generally, to carry an off-duty weapon at all times. This traditional requirement is 
not applicable to peace officers as a matter of departmental regulation, but it has become 
customary. For a variety of reasons, peace officers whose functions are most closely related 
to police duties commonly consider the privilege to carry a weapon off-duty as a right. News 
stories of peace officers intervening to terminate criminal activity are common. 
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rections officers, to carry firearms off-duty. While self-protection is 
a component, it is far more likely that a corrections officer like 
Warner will encounter hoopleheads committing crimes, rather than 
former guests of the state seeking vengeance. Further, the distinc- 
tion between police and peace officer status is blurred not only in 
the eyes of the public but, at this point, is sometimes not clear to 
peace officers either. The uniforms and shields of peace officers are 
virtually identical to police uniforms and shields, training is similar 
and often joint, both exercise official duties in the community, and 
both classes of officers frequently work together. Of equal impor- 
tance, peace officers may psychologically view themselves as being 
in the same profession as police and they may react to the same 
stimuli for intervention. It is hard to deny that the public purpose 
is served when trained officers, permitted by the State to go about 
armed, aid in combatting crime. Such intervention certainly should 
be no bar to invoking the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
The decision in Frazier protects the public purse while remov- 
ing an incentive for peace officers to augment the police. This is 
not a useful savings, and the statutes relied upon by the court ma- 
jority do not dictate this unwelcome result. 
C. Recovery for Emotional Trauma 
Perhaps the most important torts decision for the Survey year 
was Bovsun u. S ~ n p e r i , ' ~ ~  in which the Court of Appeals brought 
New York common law in line with that of many jurisdictions by 
recognizing a cause of action for emotional injuries sustained by 
victims in a zone of danger who observe the death or serious injury 
of a member of their immediate family. 
Writing for the Court majority, Judge Jones began the opinion 
with the following succinct statement, outlining the major change 
in New York tort jurisprudence: 
Where a defendant's conduct is negligent as creating an unrea- 
sonable risk of bodily harm to a plaintiff and such conduct is a 
substantial factor in bringing about injuries to the plaintiff in 
consequence of shock or fright resulting from his or her contem- 
poraneous observation of serious physical injury or death inflicted 
by the defendant's conduct on a member of the plaintiffs imme- 
diate family in his or her presence, the plaintiff may recover dam- 
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ages for such injuries.lSs 
The Court's reasoning for its position is essentially a recapitu- 
lation of arguments that have been raised over a period of decades, 
both in New York and in sister jurisdictions that have recognized 
the zone-of-danger rulels4 for a long time. Perhaps the main thrust 
of Bovsun, after announcement of the new doctrine, is to declare 
what the case is not. The Court held that: 
The zone-of-danger rule that we adopt here is not inconsistent 
with the past decisions of our court that have denied recovery for 
emotional distress attributable to a family member's death or in- 
jury . . . . None of these cases involved plaintiffs who had them- 
selves been subject to a danger of bodily harm, although some of 
the plaintiffs had been present during, had observed, and even 
had participated in the negligent conduct.186 
Thus, New York will continue to refuse to recognize the claim 
of a mother who, although in no danger herself, witnesses the neg- 
ligent killing of her The case failed to decide who will be 
considered to be members of the immediate family.lS7 
Bovsun was a four-to-three decision, and the dissenting opin- 
133. Id. a t  223-24, 461 N.E.2d a t  844, 473 N.Y.S.2d a t  358. 
134. See id. a t  229 1~7,461 N.E.2d a t  847 ~ 7 , 4 7 3  N.Y.S.2d a t  361 n.7 (noting that only 
two reported decisions upheld recovery in those jurisdictions). The zone-of-danger rule al- 
lows one who is himself threatened with bodily harm in consequence of the defendant's 
negligence to recover for emotional distress resulting from viewing the death or serious 
physical injury of a member of his or her immediate family. Id. a t  228,461 N.E.2d a t  847, 
473 N.Y.S.2d a t  361. 
135. Id. at 232, 461 N.E.2d a t  849, 473 N.Y.S.2d a t  363 (citations omitted). 
136. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 
(1969) (holding that a mother could not recover for the harm sustained by the shock and 
fear for her two-year-old child who suffered from serious automobile accident injuries). For 
simiiar denials in cases of third party psychic injuries, see LaEerty v. Manhasset Medical 
Center Hosp., 54 N.Y.2d 277, 429 N.E.2d 789, 445 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1981); Vaccaro v. Squibb 
Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 
N.Y.2d 401,386 N.E.2d 807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109,366 
N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977). 
137. See Bovsun, 61 N.Y.2d a t  233 ~ 1 3 , 4 6 1  N.E.2d a t  850 1~13,473 N.Y.S.2d a t  364 n. 
13. Whatever the definition of immediate family will be as Bousun is explored in future 
litigation, it  is clear that both unmarried-heterosexual and homosexual couples will not be 
able to base a cause of action on Bovsun. This is regrettable, and it is possible, but perhaps 
not too likely, that an interpretation of Bovsun extending the concept of immediate family 
could yield a broader and more humane concept of recovery for psychic trauma. The ration- 
ale for permitting a family member who is in the zone of danger to recover for the emotional 
damage resulting from the viewing of the death or serious injury of another family member 
can be logically applied to non-family relationships of long-standing. 
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ion, authored by Judge Kaye, covered most of the oft-repeated rea- 
sons for not recognizing a cause of action for psychic trauma.138 
The dissent viewed the majority's action as creating a new 
with "artificial and arbitrary"140 limitations. The dissenters would 
continue reliance on prior cases."' The dissent noted that the 
zone-of-danger rule has been critized in other jurisdi~tions,"~ but 
some of these jurisdictions in fact go beyond the scope of the cause 
of action recognized by the Bovsun maj~rity."~ Essentially, the 
dissent appears concerned with the cost of newly recognized rights, 
and its disagreement with the majority is rooted in fundamental 
policy, rather than in criticism of doctrinal interpretation. Indeed, 
in a short opinion concurring with Judge Kaye, Judge Wachtler 
maintained that "[tlhe institutional stability of a court is more im- 
portant than any desire to remedy what may be perceived as a 
harsh application of the rule in a given case."144 
It is questionable what institutional stability value can be im- 
perilled when the highest court of New York joins a large number 
of respected sister states in recognizing a cause of action for zone- 
of-danger recovery of psychic injuries. The societal cost will proba- 
bly not be high because, in many instances, the members of the 
family all sustain physical injury and the emotional harm is indi- 
visible from the physical injury. Further, Bovsun leaves for future 
adjudication what elements of proof must be established to allow 
138. See id. a t  234, 461 N.E.2d a t  850, 473 N.Y.S.2d a t  364 (Kaye, J., dissenting). 
139. See id., 461 N.E.2d a t  850-51, 473 N.Y.S.2d a t  364-65 (Kaye, J., dissenting). 
140. Id. (Kaye, J., dissenting). 
141. See id. a t  234-43, 461 N.E.2d a t  850-56, 473 N.Y.S.2d a t  364-70 (Kaye, J., 
dissenting). 
142. See id. a t  242 n.5, 461 N.E.2d a t  856 n.5, 473 N.Y.S.2d a t  370 n.5 (Kaye, J., 
dissenting). 
143. See id. (Kaye, J., dissenting) (citing Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 
69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981); Dziokonski 
v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555,380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978)). Reliance on these cases by the dissent- 
ers is disingenuous, because each case either follows or expands California's doctrine of re- 
covery for psychic harm following the witnessing of death or injury of a close relative, with- 
out reference to the plaintiff being in the zone of danger. To the extent that these cases 
expose a weakness in the reasoning of the Bovsun majority, the weakness is that the deci- 
sion does not go far enough. 
144. 61 N.Y.2d a t  243, 461 N.E.2d a t  856, 473 N.Y.S.2d a t  370 (Wachtler, J., dissent- 
ing). The harshness to which Judge Wachtler refers is not the "harsh application of the rule 
in a given case," but the reality, grasped by the majority, that the rule itself created an 
unfair and cruel result. Perhaps Judge Wachtler's short dissent unconsciously mirrors the 
judicial conservatism that has characterized the New York Court of Appeals in the past 
decade. 
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for recovery for psychic harm absent physical trauma. There is no 
reason to believe that the courts will permit runaway emotional 
distress verdicts. This has not happened with the tort of inten- 
tional infliction of mental distress, still a relative newcomer to New 
York jurispr~dence,'~~ and it should not happen in this area. 
Soon after Bovsun, the first department decided Landon v. 
New York H ~ s p i t a l . ' ~ ~  Citing Bovsun, the appellate court ruled 
that the parents of a child exposed to bacterial meningitis were 
barred from recovering for psychic trauma because of their own 
fear of contracting the disease.I4' Allegedly, negligence resulted in 
a delay in diagnosing and treating the infant plaintiffs condition. 
Reversing the trial court, the appellate division dismissed on the 
basis of existing case law, buttressed by Bovsun. The court noted 
that 
[tlhe duty of diagnosis ran to the child and not to the parents. To 
the extent that the parents were allegedly exposed to the disease 
prior to the diagnosis, no cause of action is properly pleaded for 
the obvious reason that no damage was sustained during that pe- 
riod. To the extent that psychic damage is asserted to flow from 
periods of time after the diagnosis, obviously there can be no re- 
covery since if there was a duty to the parents it was a duty prop- 
erly and promptly to diagnose the condition and so advise the 
parents. Plainly, no cause of action arises from such a lack of 
timely n0tificati0n.l'~ 
To be discussed at length in next year's Survey article is 
Johnson v. Jamaica H0spita1.l~~ The second department sustained 
a denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action 
where injuries were psychical. The plaintiffs nine-day-old child 
was kidnapped from the defendant's hospital's premises and was 
not located until four and one-half months later. The Court of Ap- 
peals reversed the appellate division and a full discussion of that 
opinion will no doubt be included in the next Survey article. 
145. See Halio v. Lurie, 15 A.D.2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (2d Dep't 1961) (initial allow- 
ance of recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
146. 101 A.D.2d 489, 476 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1st Dep't 1984), appeal dismissed, 63 N.Y.2d 
754,471 N.E.2d 457, 481 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1984). 
147. See 101 A.D.2d at 495-96, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 308. 
148. Id. 
149. 95 A.D.2d 598, 467 N.Y.S.2d 634 (2d Dep't 1983), reu'd, 62 N.Y.S.2d 523, 467 
N.E.2d 502, 478 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1984) (certified question answered in the negative). 
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D. Legal Malpractice 
No major decisions were reported during the Survey year in 
the area of legal malpractice. Two examples of impermissible 
courtroom antics, however, reached the second department. The 
conduct of defense counsel mandated a reversal and directions for 
a new trial in Giumara v. O'D0nnel1.l~~ Describing counsel's behav- 
ior as "gross impropriety," the appellate panel found unacceptable 
the attorney's statements that the case was surrounded by mystery 
and deception, that there was something strange in the fact that 
6 6  9,  the plaintiff spelled her name with one r instead of the two as 
found in official records, and similar statements.lS1 Gratuitous and 
offensive references to religion only added to the destruction of the 
trial process. The only mystery is why the trial judge did not de- 
clare a mistrial himself. 
The Rockaways in Queens have seen better times and hardly 
any worse than the present. Perhaps urban redevelopment of this 
blighted area of Queens will be boosted by a second department 
finding that "a midday visit to a beach in the Rockaways during 
the month of June simply does not indicate moral turpitude."lS2 
Such a conclusion was implied by defense counsel in Guzzardi v. 
Grotas,16$ a personal injury action. Reversal and directions for a 
new trial followed appellate review of the trial, in which the de- 
fense counsel had suggested that the presence of the married 
plaintiff in the car of the defendant imputed adultery. This com- 
ment, the court held, was "highly prejudicial."lM 
A. Products Liability 
Perhaps the most important products liability decision of the 
Survey year was Martin v. Edwards Laboratories, Division of 
American Hospital Supply Corporati~n. '~~ Martin was consoli- 
150. 96 A.D.2d 1049, 446 N.Y.S.2d 692 (2d Dep't 1983). 
151. See id. a t  1049-50, 466 N.Y.S.2d a t  693. "[Tlhe cumulative effect of these and 
other prejudicial and highly inflammatory remarks made by defense counsel, which were 
totally irrelevant to any legitimate issue presented a t  trial, would require reversal of the 
judgment . . ." Id. a t  1051, 466 N.Y.S.2d a t  695. 
152. Guzzardi v. Grotas, 98 A.D.2d 761, 762, 469 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476 (2d Dep't 1983). 
153. See id. 98 A.D.2d a t  761,469 N.Y.S.2d 475 (2d Dep't 1983). 
154. See id. a t  761-62, 469 N.Y.S.2d a t  476. 
155. 60 N.Y.2d 417, 457 N.E.2d 1150, 469 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1983). 
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dated with Lindsey v. A.H. Robins Co., which was discussed in last 
year's Torts Survey a r t i~1e . l~~  Speaking for the Court, Judge Meyer 
announced that "[tlhe Statute of Limitations for personal injury 
caused by the malfunctioning of a prosthetic or contraceptive de- 
vice implanted or inserted into the human body runs from the date 
of the injury resulting from the malfunction, not necessarily from 
the date of implantation or insertion."16' 
In a decision without dissent, the Court found that the appro- 
priate period for calculating the statute of limitations in product 
insertion or implantation case must begin with the malfunction or 
failure of the device or prosthesi~. '~~ New York has agonized over 
the years about products liability statutes of limitations com- 
mencement periods.169 The rule announced in Martin is the only 
rule that makes sense. Implanted devices can be, and too often are, 
time bombs. Inspection during use is often impossible and usually 
dangerous. Latent defects become apparent long after any breach 
of warranty action is possible. Often there is no negligence in the 
implantation process and the sole remedy is one based on strict 
products liability. To deny a cause of action when the undetectable 
occurs after three years is to make product safety in this sensitive 
area a horse race, with manufacturers and sellers safe when a pa- 
tient passes the three year mark. 
Law students who have mastered common law strict liability 
as represented by Rylands v. Fletcherle0 and the extra-hazardous 
activities caseslel sometimes have problems in dealing with strict 
products liability and, in particular, with the long line of defective 
design cases. Assured by the professor that they are dealing with 
strict liability, they hesitantly explore what, with increasing farnili- 
arity, appears to be a variation of negligence. This confusion was 
highlighted in Voss u. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co.lee The 
156. Torts, 1983 Survey of N.Y. Law, supra note 1, a t  669-70 (1984). 
157. Martin, 60 N.Y.2d a t  422, 457 N.E.2d a t  1152, 469 N.Y.S.2d a t  925. 
158. See id. a t  428, 457 N.E.2d a t  1155-56, 469 N.Y.S.2d a t  928-29. 
159. The present state of the law in New York has eliminated much of the doubt be- 
cause actions for personal injury caused by defective products are to be brought as strict 
products liability actions, with the statute of limitations to sound in tort. 
160. 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd. 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd, 3 L.R.- 
H.L. 330 (1868). 
161. See, e.g., Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11, 250 N.E.2d 31, 302 N.Y.S.2d 527 
(1969). 
162. 59 N.Y.2d 102, 450 N.E.2d 204, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1983). 
Heinonline - -  36 Syracuse L. Rev. 622 1985-1986 
19851 Torts 623 
Court of Appeals remitted for a new trial a products liability ac- 
tion in which the trial judge sent the case to the jury on a negli- 
gence cause of action only.ls3 The trial judge dismissed the plain- 
tiffs strict products liability and warranty causes of action.ls4 The 
jury returned a verdict for the defendants.ls6 
The Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff had, in fact, 
made out a prima facie case in strict products liability. His evi- 
dence that a safer product was technically possible and that the 
defendant had not marketed a reasonably safe product was suffi- 
cient to take the matter to the jury.'" While strict products liabil- 
ity carries doctrinal baggage of its own, the plaintiff tried to prove, 
in essence, that the defendant was not reasonable in marketing the 
injury-producing product. 
I t  is difficult to understand why counsel persist in bringing 
both strict products liability causes of action and negligence ac- 
tions. Only where it is possible to show gross negligence can a good 
argument be made to justify the confusion created concerning the 
two causes of action. In Voss, if the plaintiff established enough to 
carry negligence forward, he established enough to support his 
strict liability claim. 
In another Court of Appeals products liability decision, Cover 
v. Cohen,ls7 the plaintiff suffered severe and permanent injuries 
when a Chevrolet Malibu, going backwards at high speed and out 
of control, struck him.168 Issues raised on appeal included whether 
a federal motor vehicle safety standard that was not promulgated 
until after the car's manufacture, and a technical service bulletin 
that related to the cause of the plaintiffs injuries, were admissible 
into evidence.lB9 The bulletin had been sent to General Motors 
dealers after the manufacture of the Malibu.170 
The Court found that admission of the federal standard was 
erroneous,171 but that the bulletin could have been of probative 
163. See id. at 105-06, 450 N.E.2d at 207, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 401. 
164. See id. (referring to trial court's decision). 
165. See id. at 106, 450 N.E.2d at 207, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 401. 
166. See id. at 110, 450 N.E.2d at 209, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 403. 
167. 61 N.Y.2d 261, 461 N.E.2d 864, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1984). 
168. See id. at 267, 461 N.E.2d at 866, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 380. 
169. See id. at 269, 461 N.E.2d at 867, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 380. 
170. Id. at 274, 461 N.E.2d at 871, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 385. 
171. See id. at 267, 461 N.E.2d at 868, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 380. 
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value on the failure to warn issue.172 
Although Cover does not break new ground in New York prod- 
ucts liability, the case is a good discussion of the law of evidence as 
that subject applies to design defect cases. 
B. Dram Shop 
Attempts to enlarge the scope of New York's Dram Shop 
are as frequent as they are unavailing. In the latest try, a 
tavern owner sought contribution or indemnification against a ra- 
dio station that sponsored a bar party as a promotional event. The 
third-party complaint in Magee u. Landers17' was dismissed, with 
the court observing that 
[tlhe radio station had no say as to whom should be served, or 
how often. Such matters are generally understood to be the pre- 
rogative of the tavern's proprietor and his employees, and are 
matters of judgment and discretion best left to such persons, who 
are in the best position to evaluate the circumstances and act ac- 
cordingly as masters of their own  premise^."^ 
So ended another attempt to expand liability under the Dram 
Shop Act. 
A. Privacy and Publicity 
Section fifty-one of the New York Civil Rights Law176 provides 
new issues for adjudication year after year. Perhaps because New 
York has no common law cause of action for invasion of privacy, 
resort to section fifty-one is inevitable, even when the statute's ap- 
plication is questionable. This Survey year witnessed three cases in 
which the statute was successfully invoked. 
The only section fifty-one case to reach the Court of Appeals, 
172. See id. a t  277, 461 N.E.2d a t  872, 473 N.Y.S.2d at  386. 
173. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW 3 11-101(1) (McKinney 1978). The statute provides: 
Any person who shall be injured in person, property, means of support, or otherwise 
by any intoxicated person, or by reason of the intoxication of any person, whether 
resulting in his death or not, shall have a right of action against any person who 
shall, by unlawful selling to or unlawfully assisting in procuring liquor for such in- 
toxicated person, have caused or contributed to such intoxication. 
174. 122 Misc. 2d 736, 471 N.Y.S.2d 799 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga Co. 1984). 
175. Id. a t  738, 471 N.Y.S.2d a t  802. 
176. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW 8 51 ( M c K i e y  Supp. 1984-1985). 
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Dzurenko u. Jordache, I~C. ,"~ concerned limitations .on the use of 
photographs for commercial purposes where the consent was 
signed subsequent to a modeling session, rather than the usual 
practice of signing prior to such sessions. In a memorandum opin- 
ion, the Court held that the time of the signing of the consent was 
immaterial. The statute requires written consent, and the time of 
signing is not given, nor need it be implied as having to occur at 
any special time.17s 
A preliminary injunction was granted to Jacqueline Kennedy 
Onassis in Onassis u. Christian Dior-New York, I ~ C . , ' ~ ~  restraining 
the commercial use of photographs by the defendant.lsO The chal- 
lenged photographs featu~ed a "look-alike" model, and Mrs. Onas- 
sis alleged that such use violated section fifty-one of the Civil 
Rights Law.lS1 The trial judge reviewed Mrs. Onassis' career of 
public service and her assertions that she would not appear in 
commercial advertising, nor would she wish people to believe that 
she had.lE2 The court addressed the problem of imitators because 
co-defendant Barbara Reynolds maintained that "she cannot be 
prevented from using her own face."lS3 Justice Greenfield found 
that a person can indeed be restrained from using his or her own 
face if the purpose is deception for commercial gain. Justice Green- 
field stated: 
There are many aspects of identity. A person may be known 
not only by objective indicia-name, face, and social security 
number, but by other characteristics as well-voice, movement, 
style, coiffure, typical phrases, as well as by his or her history and 
accomplishments. Thus far, the Legislature has accorded protec- 
tion only to those aspects of identity embodied in name and face. 
Imitators are free to simulate voice or hair-do, or characteristic 
clothing or accessories, and writers to comment on and actors to 
re-enact events. No one is free to trade on another's name or ap- 
pearance and claim immunity because what he is using is similar 
to but not identical with the original.'** 
177. 59 N.Y.2d 788, 451 N.E.2d 477, 464 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1983). 
178. See id. at 790, 451 N.E.2d 478, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 730. 
179. 122 Misc. 2d 603, 47 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1984). 
180. See id. at 616, 472 N.E.2d at 263-64. 
181. See id. at 604, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 256. 
182. See id. at 609, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 257. 
183. Id. at 612, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 261. 
184. Id. 
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The first department decided the most interesting section 
fifty-one case of the Survey year, Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, 
I ~ c . . ~ ~ ~  A photographer allegedly snapped pictures of the plaintiff 
Cohen and her infant daughter bathing in the nude on private 
property in Woodstock, New York.lS6 Imagine the surprise of 
plaintiffs husband when he recognized his wife and daughter in 
advertisements for an anti-celluite productls7 in three major, na- 
tionally circulated publications.1ss Although the photograph does 
not show faces, 
[it] depicts two nude persons, a woman . . . leading a young girl . . 
. . Although the faces of neither are visible, the rear and side of 
the subjects can be seen. The mother appears lean, with a long, 
thin neck and short, free-flowing hair. Her waist and arms are 
slender and her right breast is visible, as is the area of the but- 
tocks, with what appear to be two dimples appearing above.18@ 
While it is unlikely, hopefully, that many could identify the 
persons in the photograph, the court concluded that the statutory 
protection of section fifty-one extended to the plaintiff.lsO Revers- 
ing summary judgment for the defendants, the first department 
found that sufficient allegations had been made to preserve the 
plaintiffs right to a verdict on the merits.lS1 
The appellate division's analysis is consistent with developing 
section fifty-one law. Many persons whose likenesses have been un- 
lawfully appropriated for commerical purposes are unknown 
outside their circle of relatives and friends. That only a handful of 
people, perhaps only a spouse, might have identified the subject of 
the photograph in Cohen is legally irrelevant. The full burden is 
properly placed upon the party seeking to benefit commercially 
185. 100 A.D.2d 175, 473 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 63 N.Y.2d 379, 472 N.E.2d 
307, 482 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1984). 
186. Id. a t  176, 473 N.Y.S.2d a t  427 (Kassal, J., concurring). 
187. See id. The photograph in the advertisement may have been flattering, but associ- 
ation with this type of product may have been an added source of annoyance to the 
plaintiff. 
188. See id. (naming the three magazines: Cosmopolitan, House Beautiful and House 
and Garden). 
189. Id. a t  176,473 N.Y.S.2d a t  428. A comprehensive search of reported Anglo-Ameri- 
can cases indicated that this is the first reported action in which dimples above buttocks 
constituted identifying marks in either a civil or criminal action. 
190. See id. a t  179, 473 N.Y.S.2d a t  429 (Kassal, J., concurring). 
191. See id. a t  189, 473 N.Y.S.2d a t  435 (Asch, J., concurring). 
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from an adverti~ernent.~~~ 
B. Libel and Slander 
The notable case of the Survey year, Sharon v. Time, Inc.lSs 
was decided after the closing date for this volume. It will be cov- 
ered in the next Survey article. 
Few major libel or slander cases were decided during the Sur- 
vey year. Held v. PokornylS4 concerned alleged intra-familial libel. 
In this diversity action, the plaintiff, an attorney who conducted 
both the practice of law and the sale of insurance on the same 
premises,lBWeged that he was libeled by his stepson in a letter 
that stated that the plaintiffs contravening of his deceased wife's 
wishes was immoral. Judge Weinfeld found that the offending 
words constituted a nonactionable statement of opinionlss and that 
the letter did not allege any breach of a professional duty or lack 
of professional integrity.lS7 We do not know if the plaintiff did dis- 
regard the wishes of the defendant's mother. 
Despite my urging to the contrary in last year's Survey arti- 
cle,lS8 the Court of Appeals reversed the second department in 
Park Knoll Associates v. Schmidt.lsS The appellate division had 
attached an absolute privilege to communications by a tenant 
192. The status of the photographer, defendant James Krieger, is not clear from the 
opinion. Presumably he was a free-lance photographer who subsequently sold his photo of 
plaintiff Cohen to the defendants. It can be assumed that, in many instances, advertise- 
ments in national magazines feature photographs originally taken by free-lancers or even 
amateurs. Section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law is properly applied as a strict liabii- 
ity tort. No duty of care on the part of the defendant who utilizes the photograph is rele- 
vant. Either there is or is not a valid, written consent for commercial use of the photograph. 
Because the photographers are often people with limited assets who may be diicult to lo- 
cate and serve, the advertiser becomes the true target of § 51 litigation. As it is clear that 
identification of the subjects in a photo by close friends or relatives based on intimate 
knowledge of the subject's body is su5cient for damages under New York law, it is espe- 
cially incumbent upon advertisers to use the highest standard of care to attempt to avoid 
litigation. 
193. 575 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
194. 583 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
195. See id. 
196. See id. a t  1039. 
197. See id. a t  1042. 
198. See Torts, 1983 Survey, supra note 1, at  677-78. 
199. 59 N.Y.2d 205,451 N.E.2d 182,464 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1983) reu'g 89 A.D.2d 164,454 
N.Y.S.2d 901 (2d Dep't 1982). 
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group leader in a quasi-judicial proceeding.200 Judge Simons wrote 
for the Court majority, finding that 
[tlhere should be a reversal. A leader who assists group members 
in registering official complaints does not enjoy an absolute privi- 
lege from liability for defamation. The social value of such leaders 
is palpable but they are not within the limited group of persons 
who because of their official participation in the processes of gov- 
ernment are granted immunity.*O1 
The Court noted that "were we to extend [an absolute privi- 
lege] to defendant here, there would be no apparent reason to deny 
immunity to the leader of any cause who encourages litigation no 
matter how worthwhile or frivolous the purpose of the move- 
ment."202 The majority failed to understand that absolute privilege 
can be granted in limited categories and that there are pressing 
reasons for recognizing a housing crisis in New York. In addition, 
there exists a traditional and continuing imbalance of power be- 
tween tenants in a shrinking housing market and landlords who 
frequently seek to convert rental buildings to cooperative or condo- 
minium ownership status. Judge Wachtler, dissenting, noted that 
"if there are compelling reasons for granting an absolute privilege 
to litigants and attorneys appearing before this body [State Divi- 
sion of Housing and Community Renewal], the privilege should ap- 
ply as well to those volunteer representatives whom the tenant has 
chosen to speak on his or her behalf."203 What was not recognized 
by either the majority or the dissenting judges is that landlords are 
virtually always represented by counsel, while tenants are often de- 
pendent upon leaders from within the tenant body. Although ten- 
ant leaders are sometimes not trustworthy, this possibility should 
not be asserted in order to deny tenants the privilege of adequate 
representation. Park Knoll handicaps the tenant groups that most 
need protection, those without legal representation. 
In Matherson v. Marchel10,~~~ the first department held that 
"defamation which is broadcast by means of radio or television 
200. See Park Knoll Assocs. v. Schmidt, 89 A.D.2d 164, 454 N.Y.S.2d 901 (2d Dep't 
1982). 
201. 59 N.Y.2d a t  207, 451 N.E.2d a t  183, 464 N.Y.S.2d a t  425. 
202. Id. a t  210, 451 N.E.2d a t  185, 464 N.Y.S.2d a t  427. 
203. Id. a t  211, 451 N.E.2d a t  186, 464 N.Y.S.2d a t  427-28 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). 
204. 100 A.D.2d 233, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998 (2d Dep't 1984). 
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should be classified as The defendants stated that one of 
the plaintiffs was having an &air with a defendant.206 The issue as 
to whether the words used were clearly libelous was easily resolved 
against the defendants and the court reversed the trial court's 
granting of the defendants' motion to dismiss.207 
The court held that if the defendants' comments were viewed 
as slanderous, special damages must be pleaded and proved unless 
a cause of action can be pleaded under the four special categories 
of slander per se.208 The court continued, "On the other hand, a 
plaintiff suing in libel need not plead or prove special damages . . . 
The court observed that "traditionally, the demarcation be- 
tween libel and slander rested upon whether the words were writ- 
ten or spoken,"210 but that "with the advent of mass communica- 
tion, the differential was blurred."211 
Recognition that the potential harm of broadcast defamation 
makes libel rather than slander the proper cause of action212 was 
overdue in New York. 
In Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. Time-Life Books, Inc.,21S a diversity 
action, district court Judge Goettel denied a motion to dismiss.214 
The plaintiff claimed product disparagement in that the defen- 
dant's exercise book implied that the plaintifPs exercise program 
was dangerous.215 The action is likely to be discussed in a future 
Survey article. 
To be discussed in the next Survey article is Gaeta v. New 
205. Id. a t  239, 473 N.Y.S.2d a t  1004. 
206. Id. a t  234, 473 N.Y.S.2d a t  1000. 
207. See id. a t  233,473 N.Y.S.2d at 1000. 
208. See id. a t  235-36, 473 N.Y.S.2d a t  1001. 
209. Id. a t  236, 473 N.Y.S.2d a t  1001. 
210. Id. a t  239, 473 N.Y.S.2d a t  1003. 
211. Id. 
212. A number of courts have held that defamatory broadcasts on radio or television 
are libelous rather than slanderous. See, e.g., Shor v. B i g s l e y ,  4 Misc. 2d 857, 158 
N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1957); ajf'd 4 A.D.2d 1017, 169 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1st Dep't 
1957). Older readers of the Survey will remember Sherman Billingsley, owner of New York's 
Stork Club, who pioneered in the field of live and vacuous television interviews. Bernard 
"Toots" Shor, who just happened to own a rival establishment, took umbrage a t  Billings- 
ley's remarks. The case marks one of the first judicial examinations of the impact of defam- 
atory statements uttered on television. 
213. 570 F. Supp 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
214. See id.  a t  158. 
215. See id.  a t  152-53. 
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York News, Inc2l6 The first department affirmed the dismissal by 
the trial judge of a complaint related to an alleged libel concerning 
the plaintiffs relationship to her deceased The Court of Ap- 
peals reversed during the summer of 1984.218 
C. Miscellaneous Intentional Torts 
Malicious prosecution is a tort that seldom results in a suc- 
cessful plaintiffs case. The Court of Appeals validated this truth 
in Colon v. City of New Y ~ r k . ~ ~ ~  The plaintiff, falsely imprisoned 
by the defendant city, argued that charges against him for second 
degree murder lacked probable cause and thus constituted mali- 
cious prosecution.220 The Court reviewed the stringent standards 
needed for a plaintiff to prevail and found that no colorable 
grounds existed for the malicious prosecution cause of action.221 In 
effect, the plaintiff challenged the sufficiency of the police investi- 
gation that led to his indictment.222 As the Court noted, however, 
"[u]ndoubtedly, further avenues of investigation were open to the 
police before they relied on circumstantial evidence of the killer's 
identity, but their failure to pursue the investigation is not the 
equivalent of fraud or the suppression of evidence."223 
In Burns Jackson v. Lindner,224 the Court of Appeals dis- 
missed a nuisance action that was literally a nuisance in itself. Af- 
firming the dismissal of the action by the second department, the 
Court found that a law firm could not seek damages from a labor 
union and selected officers because of inconvenience caused by a 
transit strike.226 The harm suffered by the law firm was of the kind 
experienced by everyone who was discommoded by this particular 
labor action and, therefore, was not cognizable as legally recover- 
216. 95 A.D.2d 315, 466 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1st Dep't 1983), rev'd, 62 N.Y.2d 340, 465 
N.E.2d 802, 477 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1984). 
217. See 95 A.D.2d a t  329, 466 N.Y.S.2d at  329. 
218. See 62 N.Y.2d a t  351, 465 N.E.2d a t  807,477 N.Y.S.2d at  87. 
219. 60 N.Y.2d 78, 455 N.E.2d 1248, 468 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1983). 
220. See id. a t  80, 455 N.E.2d a t  1249, 468 N.Y.S.2d at  454. 
221. See id. a t  82-83, 455 N.E.2d a t  1250-51, 468 N.Y.S.2d a t  455-56. 
222. See id. a t  83, 455 N.E.2d a t  1251, 468 N.Y.S.2d a t  456. 
223. Id. 
224. 59 N.Y.2d 314, 451 N.E.2d 459, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1983), aff'g 88 A.D.2d 50, 452 
N.Y.S.2d 80 (2d Dep't 1982). 
225. See 59 N.Y.2d a t  324, 451 N.E.2d a t  462, 468 N.Y.S.2d a t  714-15. 
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able damages?26 The Court of Appeals gave this action more atten- 
tion than it deserved. 
In the area of false arrest, the Court of Appeals ruled in Dabbs 
v. State227 that a John Doe arrest warrant was invalid when the 
indicted person's name became known and the warrant was exe- 
cuted without adding the name.228 Liability for false arrest can be 
predicated upon a defective John Doe ~ a r r a n t . 2 ~ ~  
Horseplay with a tragic result was analyzed in Herman v. 
W e s t g ~ t e . ~ ~ ~  The fourth department held that, in an action for as- 
sault and battery, a defendant's participation in concerted tortious 
activity was enough to sustain the assault and battery action.2s1 It 
was not necessary for the defendant to personally push the plain- 
tiff into the water.2s2 
The second department held, in Baron v. Jeffer,2ss that in a 
cause of action for intentional infliction of mental distress, "it 
would be contrary to public policy to recognize the existence of 
this type of tort in the context of disputes, as here, arising out of 
the differences between persons who, although not married, have 
been living together as husband and wife for an extended period of 
time . . . ."2s4 Because New York law shies away from applying this 
tort to married couples, it is rational to withhold the cause of ac- 
tion from those who choose to live together. 
In the age of the national hotel chain, the innkeeper's rights 
and duties are still litigated regularly. The first department, in 
Pollock v. Holsa C0rp.,2~~ denied recovery for wrongful eviction 
from a motel room "in the middle of the night,"2s6 insofar as the 
damages sought were for humiliation and psychic distress or were 
based on punitive damages theoryFs7 The plaintiff was entitled, 
however, to recover on a contract theory for the "physical discom- 
226. See id. a t  334, 451 N.E.2d a t  468, 464 N.Y.S.2d a t  721. 
227. 59 N.Y.2d 213,451 N.E.2d 186, 464 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1983). 
228. See id. a t  217, 451 N.E.2d a t  187-88, 464 N.Y.S.2d a t  429-30. 
229. See id. a t  218, 451 N.E.2d a t  188, 464 N.Y.S.2d a t  430 (without a facially valid 
warrant, the burden is on the state to show that the arrest was otherwise privileged). 
230. 94 A.D.2d 938, 464 N.Y.S.2d 315 (4th Dep7t 1983). 
231. See id. a t  939,464 N.Y.S.2d a t  316. 
232. Id. 
233. 98 A.D.2d 810, 469 N.Y.S.2d 815 (2d Dep't 1983). 
234. Id. a t  811, 469 N.Y.S.2d a t  817. 
235. 98 A.D.2d 265, 470 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1st Dep't 1984). 
236. Id. a t  266, 470 N.Y.S.2d a t  152. 
237. See id. 
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fort" of being evicted.2s8 The fact that the hotel clerk was courte- 
ous defeated any claim for tort-based damages for breach of an 
innkeeper's 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Tort law remains, in most areas, a viable basis for determining 
rights and duties in a complex society. The common law of torts 
will continue in the next year to be pushed, prodded, tested, 
praised, and damned. There are critical problems. The courts must 
recognize that, apart from waiting passively for legislative action 
dealing with the medical malpractice situation, judges and lawyers 
share a duty to assure that compensation for the negligently in- 
jured be rationally and justly achieved without contributing to 
waste, irrational and prejudicial awards, and a growing public per- 
ception that views malpractice litigation as a quasi-pastime. The 
upholding of arbitration clauses where approprate should be a goal 
for trial courts to reach or for appellate courts to mandate. 
238. See id. at 266-67, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 152. 
239. See id. 
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